Abstract: In this paper we deal with several classes of simple games; the first class is the one of ordered simple games (i.e. they admit of a complete desirability relation). The second class consists of all zero-sum games in the first one.
Introduction
In this paper we consider four subclasses of simple games. A simple game is a cooperative multiperson game in which each coalition either wins, i.e. is all powerful ("obtains a fixed positive payoff"), or loses, i.e. is completely ineffective ("obtains no payoff"). Frequently it is possible to specify the winning coalitions of a simple game by assigning nonnegative weights to the players such that the aggregated weight of each winning coalition exceeds a positive level or coincides with it, whereas the weight of each losing coalition is less than this level. The vector which consists of both, the level and the weights of the players, is known as a representation of the game, which is in this case a weighted majority game. The set of these games is the first of the considered subclasses. For the explicit definitions we refer to Section i.
The terms "simple" and "weighted majority" were introduced by v. Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . Both simple and weighted majority games appear in many applications of game theory (see e.g. Shapley (1962) ).
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Up to now no direct procedure of generating the class of weighted majority n-person games is known. An indirect method consists of checking the representability of each simple n-person game. It is well-known -see Maschler and Peleg (1966) -that weighted majority games have a complete desirability relation, i.e. are (up to a permutation of the set of players) directed games. Thus only directed games have to be tested as soon as a procedure to generate them is known. The second class of considered simple games is the one of directed games. The remaining two subsets consist of all zero-sum games in the classes just mentioned.
In Section 1 we introduce our basic notation and recall explicitely the strong relationship between n-person weighted majority games and n+ 1-person weighted majority zero-sum games. Therefore it is sufficient to consider directed zero-sum games in order to test representability.
In Section 2 it turns out that both, the class of directed games and the one of directed zero-sum games with a fixed number of players, are ranked partially ordered sets in a natural way. This fact leads to the important consequence that the maximal number of shift minimal coalitions of a directed game can be computed recursively with respect to the number of players -Proposition 2.3. Moreover the structure of these partially ordered sets allows to construct algorithms which generate these games.
Section 3 presents these generating procedures. The main result of this section is Proposition 3.4 applied to directed zero-sum games.
Section 4 shows methods to compute a representation of a directed game if this game is a weighted majority game. These algorithms can be used to test an arbitrary directed game for the weighted majority property. They are based on the Simplex Method and can easily be rewritten in such a way that the eventual representation is an integer one, as shown in the Concluding Remarks of this section. Moreover it turns out that the knowledge of the completeness of the desirability relation generically reduces the sizes of the considered tableaux -compared with methods not using the completeness of this relation -and thus the number of necessary pivot steps. To be more precise, Lemma 4.5, which is the main theoretical result of Section 4, can be applied to replace the incidence matrix by the shift minimal matrix with a few additional rows in the directed case.
Finally some illustrating examples and figures are given in the Appendix. Particularly the two tables, obtained with the help of a computer, demonstrate the efficiency of the algorithms presented in the main part of this paper.
Basic Notation and Preliminary Results
Duing this paper let n be a natural number, t2 = f2n = { 1 ..... n} be the set of players, and ~(I2) = {SIS -12} the set of coalitions. If v: #(I2) ~ {0, 1} is a map-ping -the characteristic function -then (f2, ~(12), v) is called simple n-person game. Note that we do not assume, as usual, v(~) = 0 for symmetry reasons (see Section 2). Since the nature of 12 and of ~(12) is determined by the characteristic function, we call v a simple game as well. A coalition S is often identified with the indicator function ls, considered as n-vector. A coalition S is winning, if v(S) ---!, and losing otherwise. The set of winning coalitions is abbreviated by W~.
In a monotone simple game all subcoalitions of the losing coalitions are losing. If each proper subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this coalition is a minimal winning coalition. It should be noted that a monotone simple game is completely determined by the set of its minimal winning coalitions, denoted by W m or Wfl, if the dependence of the game is to be stressed.
For each coalition S let D(S) = ~ 2 n-~ denote the corresponding number in the decimal system. Also, let g = (St ..... Sn) be the n-vector defined by ~ = IS n 12jl. That is, S counts the number of players in S having indices less or equal to j, for all j ~ t2 = t2~.
From now on all considered simple games are assumed to be monotone. The matrix with n columns Let v be a simple game. The relation _ c_ ~-~2, defined by i ~j, if v({i} w S) _< v({j} w S), for all coalitions S satisfying {i,j} c~ S = ~, is called desirability relation of v (see Maschler and Peleg (1966) ). For a more general definition of desirability with respect to coalitions we refer to Einy (1985) .
The simple game v is called an ordered game if its desirability relation is complete and a directed game if additionally 1 >-2 >-'" _~ n is valid. Concerning this notation we also refer to Ostmann (1987 ) and Sudh61ter (1989 .
Two players i andj are interchangeable or of the same type, iff i >-j andj >-i, which is abbreviated by i ,,~ j. Besides we recall that i is a null player or dummy, if v(S w {i}) = v(S) for all S e ~(f2). Here, we use m(S) := ~ mi (S ~ ~(t2)) and call m(S) the weight of coalition S.
ieS
A representation is called minimal, if it is minimal w.r.t, the weight of the grand coalition t2. Each weighted majority game is ordered; thus it is directed, iffit has a representation satisfying ml > m2 > "'" >-m,. Note that mi > m s implies i >-j. For these definitions and assertions we refer to Maschler and Peleg (1966) .
A simple game is a constant-sum game (we use the expression zero-sum game synonymously for historical reasons), if either S or f2\S is winning (and not both are winning) and is a superadditive game, if at most S or f2\S is winning for each coalition S. The dual game v* is defined by v*(S) = 1, iff v(f2\S) = 0 (see e.g. Shapley (1962) ). The game v is dual superadditive iff v* is superadditive.
Note that both the classes of weighted majority games and of directed games are closed under duality. To verify the first assertion, observe that if (2; m) represents a weighted majority game and 2 is chosen minimally, then (re(t2)+
-
2; m) represents v*. Moreover, v* = v, iff v is a zero-sum game. , Note that each weighted majority game is dual superadditive or superadditive. Finally observe that * is an involution, i.e. v** -v. Using Lemma 1.2 and some of the preceding assertions we obtain that Iv] = [v*] enforces v to be a zero-sum game in the case of directed games. This is no longer true in general, if v is only monotonous (see e.g. Dubey an Shapley (1978) ).
In the rest of this section we show that a list of all (n + 1),person zero-sum weighted majority games is, in some sense, sufficient and necessary in order to generate a list of all n-person weighted majority games. This fact is suggested, e.g., by Wolsey (1976) . First we need some notation. For a more general definition we refer to e.g. Einy and Lehrer (1989) . The next two lemmata are used to formulate the proclaimed result explicitely. The first part of assertion (i) is a straightforward consequence of the definition of v ~ Einy (1985) gave an example of a zero-sum extension of a directed game not being ordered, and Aumann, Peleg and Rabinowitz (1965) showed assertion (ii). Therefore the proof of this lemma is skipped.
There is a converse Statement to Lemma 1.4 in the case of a weighted majority game, which is formulated in Proposition 1.7 with the help of Definition 1.5: Let v be a directed (n + 1)-person zero-sum game. Consider the nonvoid sets T1, ..., Tttv~---t2,+~ which are uniquely determined by the requirements: It should be noted that the k-th underlying game of v is the game which arises from v as follows. At first an arbitrary player of the k-th type Tk has to be dropped. Then only the winning coalitions, which do not contain this player, are considered to be the winning coalitions of the new game. Lemma 1.6: If v is a directed (n + 1)-person zero-sum game and k, k ~ I2tt,), then
is a zero-sum game then k = t(v) > ?(v), i.e. player n + 1 is a dummy ofv.
A proof is skipped, as all necessary arguments are straightforward and almost trivial. Using the last two lemmata we obtain our proclaimed result.
Proposition 1.7:
The set of directed superadditive n-person weighted majority games is the set of all underlying games of the directed (n + 1)-person zerosum weighted majority games.
In Proposition 1.7 only superadditive n-person games are considered. The missing assertion concerning dual superadditive n-person weighted majority games follows especially from Lemma 1.6 (iv) by looking at dual games and is therefore not stated in detail. We only formulate the exact result concerning the cardinalities of these sets of games in Corollary 1.8.
Let Z. and Z~ denote the set of directed n-person zero-sum games and those having a representation respectively. That is, Z. = {vlv is a directed n-person zero sum-game} and Z', = {v ~ Z, Iv is a weighted majority game} .
Moreover let R. be the set of directed n-person weighted majority games. From the fact that R. can be partitioned into its superadditive games and dual superadditive non zero-sum games, formally written
we obtain the following result, concerning the cardina!ity of R.. 
In the next section it turns out that the classes of directed games and of directed zero-sum games together with certain natural relations form partially ordered sets; the first being additionally a lattice. This gives some insight into the structure of these classes of games. Moreover the partial order relations will enable us to formulate algorithms which generate both, the directed nperson and the directed n-person zero-sum games. These procedures are presented in Section 3.
The Partially Ordered Sets
This section is organized as follows. At first it is recalled that each directed game is completely determined by a subset of its minimal winning coalitions, the shift minimal coalitions (see Ostmann (1987) ). Moreover the definition of the span of a coalition -Definition 2.1 -induces a relation on the set of coalitions. The arising partially ordered set is isomorphic to the well-known lattice of "partitions".
In what follows it turns out that the directed games can be considered as the filters of this lattice. These filters ordered by inclusion form again a lattice. Finally a relation on the directed zero-sum games is defined very similarly, such that this class again is a partially ordered set.
At first some notation is needed.
Definition 2.1:
The span of a coalition S is the set (S) = {T_ f2lT > S}. Moreover, define the span of a subset A _ ~(12) by (A) = U <s>.
SeA
It is known (see e.g. Ostmann (1987) ) that v is a directed game, iff (W~) = Vr Moreover, in this case there is a unique minimal subset (i.e. minimal w.r.t. inclusion) W~ ~ ___ W~ such that (W~) = W~, The elements of W~ are the shift minimal coalitions of v, which are automatically minimal winning coalitions. The directed game v is completely determined by W~. The corresponding submatrix of the incidence matrix is the shift minimal matrix of v, abbreviated
For this notation we again refer to Ostmann (1987) . This partially ordered set (M(n), <) was introduced by Euler (1750) and it / k can easily be seen that it has a unique rank function (given by a ~ s ai} k i=1 / with maximal rank (n + 1~ Here a rank function r of a partially ordered set \ 2 ,/" (P, _) is a mapping from P to N w {0} with r(~) = 0 for some minimal element ~ P such that x -<. y(x, y ~ P) implies r(y) = r(x) + 1.
Definition 2.2: Two coalitions S, T e ~(I2) are defined to satisfy S_ T, if _< T; and S -<" T if S # T, S -< T and additionally S < R < T implies R
Moreover it is a lattice, i.e., to each two elements a, b there is a unique minimal element covering both and a unique maximal element covered by both a and b (which can be seen in ~(f2) by observing that R = max(min){S, T}, where/~j = max(min) {~, ~} (S, T ~ ~(f2)) componentwise).
Finally (M(n), <) is rank symmetric (which is seen in (g~(12), _) using the mapping S ~-~ I2\S for all S ~ ~(f2)). Here a partially ordered set (P, _) with rank function r is rank symmetric, if r(P) = max{r(x)lx ~ P} exists and the cardinalities of the k-th and the (r(P) -k)-th level of P (where the k-th level of P is the set {x ~ Plr(x) = k}) coincide for 0 < k < r(e).
Let ~ denote the cardinality of the k-th level of (M(n), <), i.e.
A subset of pairwise comparable elements of a partially ordered set is a chain. A subset containing no chain of cardinality k + 1 is a k-family. Stanley (1980) proved that (M(n), <)has the strong Sperner property. That is, the maximal cardinality of a k-family is the largest sum of cardinalities of k levels, formally written max{IFllF is a k:family of (M(n), <)} k n+l = max ~r,.10 < i~ < ... < ik <
.
Moreover he showed that (M(n), _<) is rank unimodal. That means ~ _< "" _< N ~;, -> ~k'+l >-"'" >-~(n § for some k. For another proof of the strong Sperner property and the raffk unimodality, only using methods of linear algebra, we refer to Proctor (1982a, b) , These proofs -besides -show a famous conjecture of Erdrs and Moser (1965) . For the notations we refer to Engel and Gronau (1985) . Now it is clear by the preceding definitions that the directed n-person games are exactly the filters of (~(g2), _), i.e. if v is directed, then W~ is a filter and vice vesa. Here a filter of a partially ordered set (P, _) is a subset F _ P such that x ~ F and y ~ P with x ~ y implies y E F. Moreover each filter is spanned by its minimal elements, which are exactly the shift minimal coalitions of the corresponding game. Here it should be noted that the filter ~(~2) must not be excluded, because we allow the empty coalition to be a winning one (see Section 1).
With the help of these results the maximal cardinality of the set of shift minimal coalitions of a directed n-person game can be given. It is well-known NOW we come back to the directed games, considered as filters of (~(t2), -<) or (M(n), <_). These filters are ordered by inclusion and it easily turns out that ({ W~lv is a directed n-person game}, _~) again is a ranked partially ordered set with rank function r, defined by r(Wv) = 2" -I Wvl, and total rank 2 n. The case n = 4 is illustrated in Fig. 2 , where IS(v) is written instead of W~. In order to distinguish these partially ordered sets from the sets (~(s'2), __), we sketch the corresponding Hasse diagrams in such a way that the larger elements are on the right hand side of the smaller elements (not as above in the sketches of the Hasse Diagrams of the sets (~(t2), _)).
This partially ordered set is a lattice,: since (W~ u W~,)= Wou W~, and (W~ n W~,) = W~ c~ W~, for each pair of directed games (v, v') . Moreover the rank symmetry is easily checked by applying the mapping v ~ v* and observing that the restriction on the k-th level is bijective on the 2" -k-th level. Additionally we conjecture that it is rank unimodal, although the linear algebra methods used by Proctor (1982a, b) cannot solve this problem. The set of filters ordered by inclusion is indeed uniquely modular but there is no edge labeling for general n as it exist in the lattice (M(n), <_), sketched in Fig. 4 of the Appendix for n = 4, 5, 6.
In the end of this section it is shown that the set of directed n-person zerosum games Z, ordered with respect to a certain relation form a partially ordered set. At first we define the relation on Zn, where n > 2 is assumed for the rest of this section. 
Generating Procedures
First of all we present the theoretical foundations of two algorithms. The first algorithm is constructed with the aim to generate a subgraph of the lattice of directed n-person games. The second one generates a subgraph of the partially ordered set of directed n-person zero-sum games. Both subgraphs contain all vertices of the corresponding partially ordered sets and, additionally, are trees. The necessary assertionS concerning directed games and directed zero-sum games are formulated simultaneously because of the similarity of both generating methods. Finally, we show that both algorithms can easily be extended to procedures which generate the remaining edges in addition.
In this section we assume n _> 3 for all assertions concerning zero-sum games and start with Definition 3.1:
(i) Let D. denote the set of directed n-person games and D.,~ denote the i-th level of this set, i.e.,
D,,, = (v ~ D, Ir(v) = i} for 0 _< i < 2" (See Section 2 for the definition of the rank function r). (ii) Let v be a directed n-person game. Then W~ = {S e W~ ~] T ~ Wv for each T with D(T) > D(S)}
is the set of large coalitions of v.
With the help of the next lemma we define two mappings (see Definition 3,3). By applying these mappings to a game of the corresponding partially ordered set we obtain an edge or a set of edges respectively.
Lemma 3.2:
Let v and v ~ be a game in D.j and Z,,i for some 0 <j < 2" and 0 < i < r, respectively. Proof." All assertions concerning v are straightforward consequences of the corresponding definitions Therefore, only the zero-sum case has to be considered.
(i) Observing that D(Tmax(v~ > 2 n-1 assertion (i) is directly implied by Remark 2.5. (ii) In order to verify (ii) it suffices to show that ~o is directed, since this game clearly has the zero-sum property. Assume on the contrary that ~ is not directed and put T := f2\S, thus (T)k(W~o\{S} w {T}) ~ ~. Take a coalition T 1 of this nonvoid subset of all coalitions, then T _< ~1, T t ~ W~, thus 12~T ~ <_ f2kT = ~{ and g2kT ~ W~o. Therefore T 1 must coincide with S, because S is shift minimal. If lTI = 1, then I2\{1} is no winning coalition, since (I2\{1}) s S # I2\{1} (note that 1 ~ S holds true because S is a large coalition) and ({1}) ~ S # {1}, since n > 3 holds true. Thus {1} is no winning coalition. The union of these last two coalitions is I2, a contradiction to the zero-sum property of v. Therefore define: tl = min T and t 2 = min T\{tl} .
If t 2 = t I + 1, then (T) ~ T 2 := Tu {1}\{tl} ~ T 3 := Tu {1}\{t2} ~ (T)
and clearly S covers both of these coalitions, i.e. S ~ (T 2 ) (3 (T3), which contradicts the shift minimality of S. In the remaining case, i.e. t2 > tl + 1, T 3 can be substituted by T u {t2 -1}\{t2} and the same arguments lead to a contradiction, q.e.d.
The assertions of this lemma concerning the directed game v can be reformulated as follows. The games v and ~ are joined by an edge. Moreover, v and ~, for each ~, are connected by an edge in the lattice of directed games. Clearly, an analogon is true in case of the directed zero-sum game v ~ This motivates the following Now the arising algorithm s to generate all directed n-person games and all those zero-sum games can be formulated. We restrict ourselves to the zero-sum case since the other one is completely analogous.
Starting with the unique game of Z.,o and applying pO yields Z.. x. If Z..f is constructed and i < r., then Z.a+l is obtained by applying pO to each element of Z.,i.
It should be remarked that this algorithm can be modified in such a way that the arising procedure computes all edges of the partially ordered set (Z., _<_): Compared to the algorithm which generates a tree this method clearly is much more slowly, since all edges of the partially ordered set are generated. It has an analogon in the case of directed games -induced by ~ which considers all shift minimal coalitions of each game.
Remark 3.5:
There is another algorithm generating all directed n-person games.
This procedure successively constructs the games with respect to their lexicographical position, does not reveal the order structure of the class of games, and is thus of less theoretical interest. Moreover, it has no analogon in the zero-sum case. Therefore we skip a detailed description of this method, though it is faster than the one mentioned above.
All methods have been implemented on a computer. For examples we refer to the Appendix.
The last section gives an answer to the question how the games of Z, can be tested for representability.
Testing of Directed Zero-Sum Games for Representability
It is the aim of this section to compute one element of the least core of a given directed zero-sum game using the Simplex Method. Peleg (1968) proved that in the weighted majority case each element of the least core corresponds to a representation of the game, thus this procedure yields the desired test of representability. For further connections between representations of weighted majority games (homogeneous games), the least core, and other solution concepts see Peleg and Rosenmiiller (1992) , Peleg, Rosenm/Jller and Sudh61ter (1994), and Rosenm~iller and Sudh61ter (1994) .
At first we demonstrate that the least core of each monotone simple zerosum game coincides with the set of equilibria of a certain non-cooperative matrix game (see Corollary 4.3). Then we show that this matrix being the incidence matrix can be substituted by the shift minimal matrix with a few additional rows in the directed case (see Lemma 4.5). Finally two algorithms are formulated explicitly. Both methods compute an extreme point of the least core of an arbitrary directed zero-sum game.
We start recalling some definitions and properties concerning weighted majority zero-sum games.
If ( In what follows we use an approach similar to the first step of the algorithm computing the nucleolus considered by Wolsey (1976) (we also refer to Kopelowitz (1967) ), to compute a payoff vector for each directed zero-sum game, which is a representation in the case of a weighted majority game. For the definition of the nucleolus Schmeidler (1966) is referred to. Note that the set X, remains unchanged, if W~ is substituted by Wo '~ at all places, and that this set is the least core in the sense of Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) . Observe that X~ and X, are convex polyhedrons, containing the nucleolus of v and being subsets of the set of normalized representations of v in the weighted majority case. Indeed, Peleg (1968) only showed that the nucleolus is a normalized representation in this case. But his proof remains valid for each element of the least core.
We want to compute an extreme point of X, or Xv using the equilibrium concept of a non-cooperative matrix game which is characterized, roughly speaking, by W~ or W~ s respectively. Now we come to the detailed description of the matrix games 9 Let Fv be the matrix game characterized by the transpose matrix of the incidence matrix of the directed n-person zero-sum game v, namely A := I(v) t (i.e. the sets of strategies Y and X for player II and player I, respectively, are the sets of payoff k-and n-vectors, where k is the number of minimal winning coalitions of v. A tupel of strategies (x, y) ~ X x Y leads to the payoff xAy for player I and to -xAy for player II). Moreover 2 e X is an optimal strategy for player I, iff E Xo. For this property we refer to e.g. Rosenmiiller (1981) , Section 1. The second matrix game F* is characterized by the matrix
where Ek, n = I 1 ... 11
is a k x n matrix. We conclude that ~ is an optimal strategy for player II w.r.t. F*, iff~ ~ X~. Let en denote the n-vector (1 ..... 1). An arbitrary k x n matrix B is defined to have property (P), if each entry of B is nonnegative and B has no all-zero column 9 If F is the matrix game characterized by B, then the following lemma is well-known (see Brickmann (1989) and again Rosenmiiller (1981) ).
Lemma 4.2:
Let B be a k x n matrix with property (P). Then the following holds: max{y(12)ly _> 0 and By < ek} and min{xff2k)]x > 0 and xB > en} exist. If y and ~ is a maximizer and minimizer respectively, then (2, y)/y(g2) is an optimal pair of strategies for F. Conversely, if (~, y) is an optimal pair of strategies for F, then there are such vectors ~ or y such that ~ = ~/~(g2k) and y = y/y(t~).
The maximization problem of Lemma 4.2 is the dual of the minimization problem, thus ~(t2k) = y(f2).
The matrix A (transpose of l(v)) trivially has property (P), since no minimal winning coalition is empty. Moreover A* (consisting of all maximal losing coalitions) has property (P), as long as {v} # Zn.o is valid. It is sufficient to test the elements of Zn\Zn, o for representability, because the only remaining game is trivially a weighted majority game ((1, 0 ..... 0) is a (normalized) representation). Therefore v is assumed to be an element of Zn\Zn, 0 from now on. (ii) max{yff2k)10 < y is a k-vector and y.l(v) < e,} < 2.
The maximization problems (ii), (iii) of Corollary 4,3 can be solved by the Simplex Method. The resulting algorithms start with very simple initial tableaux consisting of either I(v) t, e, (as last column) and -ek (as last row) or Ek,n --I(v), ek (as last column) and -e. (as last row), where k denotes the cardinality of W m (see Brickmann (1989) ).
These algorithms work even in the case that the game started with is not directed (but still monotone). We proceed by constructing generically faster and quite similar algorithms, which can only be applied to directed zero-sum games. It is our aim to substitute the incidence matrix by the shift minimal matrix and a few additional rows. Conversely take x e {x e ~nlx > 0 and [(v).x < (ek, 0 ..... If S is a minimal winning coalition of v, then there is a shift minimal coalition S' such that S' < S. Let T be a row of Er,,. -l(v) . Then S = t2\T is a minimal winning coalition, showing that T' = I2\S' is a row in Ek, n --IS(v) and T' > T. Thus x(T) < x(T') < 1 (by (fl)), implying 70 >71.
ad (1): Look at the dual problems: Let x ~ R", x > 0, I(v)x < er, and x(I2) = 6o. Then analog arguments as in ad (2) show that w.l.o.g, xl >"" > x,, meaning " [(v)x < (ek, 0,..., 0) , thus 61 > 6o by looking at the dual problems.
Conversely take x e ~", x > 0 and 7(v).x < ek. Then l(v)x < e~, because of the fact xl > "'" > x,, thus 60 > 61.
q.e.d.
Clearly the extreme points of Xo and X, are the normalized extreme points of the sets of maximizers of the problem (iii) of Corollary 4.3 and Lemma 4.5 respectively. In view of the proof of the last lemma we obtain the following It should be remarked that both algorithms, slightly modified, can be used to compute an extreme point of Xv even in the case v being no weighted majority game: Apply the Simplex method until an optimum is reached. Now define the vector m/p according to the third step or (4a) respectively and observe that this vector is an extreme point of Xv in any case.
Concluding Remarks:
(1) Let v be an element of Zn or Zn\Z~, o respectively, which is a weighted majority game. Therefore roll2 -Pl is a minimal representation in the weighted majority case, if m,/12 -Pl ~ No is satisfied. Surprisingly it turns out that this vector is indeed an integer vector in many cases. In fact, the least core of each weighted majority zero-sum game with less than 9 persons is a singleton, consisting of the unique normalized minimal representation of v. In the 9-person case the algorithms of the last section generate 319,124 directed zero-sum games, from which exactly 175,428 are weighted majority games. It can be verified that ,~ and Xv coincide and are singletons, consisting of the nucleolus, in the 9-person weighted majority zero-sum case with the exception of exactly 12 games. To be more precise all 9-person weighted majority zero-sum games have a unique minimal normalized representation which coincides with the least core and thus with the nucleolus with the exception of 14 games listed in the Appendix (Table 2) , which have exactly two minimal representations differing only on one type of players.
Moreover, in 12 of these cases both representations are exactly the extreme points of the least core and the nucleolus is the midpoint of these representations. The sets Xv are the convex hulls of one of these representations and the nucleolus. In the remaining two cases no normalized minimal representation is contained in the least core though the set is a singleton. We discuss these games in what follows.
Here is the first game vl: This game is represented by ~ = (15 13 10 8 64 4 2 1), but the normalized representation ~/63 cannot be an element of X,1 or X,1, since each of the preceding algorithms yields rh = (14.5 12.5 9.5 7.5 6 4 4 1.5 1.5)/61 thus rfi(S) > 31/61 > 32/63 = rfi(So)/63 for all S E Wvl and So = {1, 2, 6}.
It remains to show that ~ is a minimal representation of v. Let m be a minimal representation. Then m 9 _> 1, since this game has no dummies. If m8 > 2 is presumed, then we can prove 7 lemmata which successively show that m 7 > 4, m 6 _> 4, m 5 > 6, m 4 >_ 8, m a > 10, m 2 _> 13, ml > 15. We only have to exclude w.l.o.g, that m8 = m9 ----1. In this case each coalition S W. my, with {8, 9} nS ~ ~ would satisfy re(S) = 2 := min{m(S)lS ~ W~I }. Using these coalitions we successively obtain m 7 = m6, m s = 2m 7 -1 = m 7 + 1, thus m 7 = 2, m4 = 2m7, m3 = 3m7 -1, mx = m 2 + 1; therefore (m 3 ..... m9)=(5 4 3 2 2 1 1). Since (1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0)is a minimal winning coalition, we additionally obtain 9 < 2m2 + 1 < 10, thus ml = 5, m2 = 4, 2 = 14, but then m({1, 2, 6)) = 11 < 14, a contradiction in view of the fact that this coalition is winning.
The second game v2 is the one represented by (17 15 11 9 7 5 4 2 1), this representation being minimal (this can be verified analogously to the first game), and (16.5 14.5 10.5 8.5 7 5 4 1.5 1.5)/69 e X~2. We conclude again that no normalized minimal representation of v2 is in Xv2.
An example of a game with two extreme points of the least core is the zero-sum extension of the game considered by Dubey and Shapley (1978) : (13 7 6 6 4 4 4 3 2)/49 is a normalized minimal representation of this game but the last two weights can be exchanged. Both normalized representations are extreme points of Xo and the first is in X~ but X~ contains the midpoint of these representations as extreme point, too. (3) Applying each algorithm to the famous 12-person weighted majority zerosum game introduced by Isbell (1959) , which has two minimal representations such that the affected players 1 and 9 are of different type, we obtain one of the normalized minimal representations, i.e. both are extreme points 1 of X v and X,. (4) Both Algorithms I and II (a) can be modified in such a way that the shift minimal and shift maximal coalitions (i.e. the complements of the shift minimal coalitions) are identified with the types of these coalitions or profiles:
S ~ a(S):= (al(S) ..... a,(v)(S)) ,
where Note that it is very easy to compute the partition sets Tj (see Sudh61ter (1989) , Section 4) and therefore this procedure will generically diminish the initial tableau and the Simplex steps 9 The disadvantage of the necessary computation of th Tj will thus be compensated especially if the number of players is large. These new algorithms yield an extreme point of the nonvoid convex subset {x~X~lx i=xjifi~j} ofX~, which is a singleton in the 9-person case. sponding lattice are the numbers of occuring shift minimal coalitions, since two directed games are joined by an edge, iff the larger one arises from the smaller one by dropping one shift minimal coalition in the corresponding filter. Analogously, the numbers of directed n-person zero-sum games are computed using the corresponding algorithm of Section 3 for n -1 ..... 9. Testing these games on representability (see e.g. Algorithm II of Section 4) yields the numbers of directed n-person weighted majority zero-sum games (see the sixth Table 2 shows the 14 games mentioned in the Concluding Remarks (2) of Section 4. The left hand side representation is computed using Algorithm I and coincides, up to normalization, with the nucleolus. Rows 10 and 11 are the "pure" exceptions.
